A Hybrid STPA-BN Framework for Quantitative Risk Assessment of Runway Incursions: A Case Study of the Austin–Bergstrom Incident

This project develops and tests a new quantitative risk‑assessment framework that combines System‑Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) with Bayesian Networks (BN) to model complex sociotechnical systems. Traditional linear risk‑assessment methods often miss the non‑linear interactions and causal links that appear in high‑consequence operations. To fix this, we created a formal mapping that turns the qualitative STPA control structures and unsafe control actions into a quantitative BN layout. The framework uses a logic‑guided parameter‑setting approach. It blends historical incident data with deterministic physical constraints, helping to deal with the scarcity of rare‑event data. We validated the method by reconstructing the 2023 Austin‑Bergstrom runway‑incursion incident in detail. The quantitative analysis looks at system

behavior under degraded conditions such as low visibility and reduced surveillance capability. A sensitivity analysis compares the impact of administrative controls with that of engineering safeguards. Overall, this work gives clear guidance for building advanced probabilistic risk‑assessment models and supports the safety evaluation of critical infrastructure and complex operational workflows.

Message: Hi FE, I need help with “A Hybrid STPA-BN Framework for Quantitative Risk Assessment of Runway Incursions: A Case Study of the Austin–Bergstrom Incident” in “Risk Assessment & Systems Safety”